Violations of IAEA agreements by IRAN
Quotes from “A Decade of Agreement Violations by IRAN” infographic
1 The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.
2 The Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); and GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).
3 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran’s obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras 1–6).
4 The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).
5 The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957, following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A.
6 The Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.
7 All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.
8 The 54 installed cascades contained approximately 8000 centrifuges; the 37 cascades declared by Iran as being fed with UF6 on that date contained 6208 centrifuges. Not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF6 may have been working.
9 The Agency previously verified that, as of 17 October 2010, a total of 3135 kg of low enriched UF6 had been produced since the start of operations in February 2007 (GOV/2011/29, para. 9).
10 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not subject to containment and surveillance.
11 GOV/2011/29, para. 10.
12 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 6 March 2011.
13 GOV/2010/28, para. 9.
14 TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.
15 GOV/2010/28, para. 9.
16 GOV/2011/29, para.14; GOV/2011/54, para. 15.
17 Iran had previously indicated its intention to install two 164-centrifuge cascades (Cascades 4 and 5) in the R&D area (GOV/2011/7, para. 17).
18 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 5 March 2011.
19 GOV/2009/74, para. 9.
20 DrFereydounAbbasi, ‘Iran to Triple Production of 20%-Enriched Uranium’, Fars News Agency, 8 June 2011.
21 GOV/2011/29, para. 20.
22 The results did show a small number of particles of depleted uranium (GOV/2010/10, para. 17).
23 ‘Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites’, Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.
24 GOV/2010/46, para. 33.
25 ‘Iran atomic chief says fuel swap talks over: IRNA’, Agence France Press article of 31 August 2011, citing remarks made by DrAbbasi during an interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency.
26 Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255 .
27 S/RES/1696 (2006), para.2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para.2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para.1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para.1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para.4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
28 The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.
29 S/RES/1737 (2006), para.2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para.1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para.1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para.4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
30 GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.
31 This was taken from Iran’s stockpile of imported UOC (GOV/2003/75, Annex I, para. 8).
32 GOV/2010/46, para. 26.
33 GOV/2011/29, para.35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42.
34 Most recently in GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).
35 S/RES/1929, paras 2 and 3.
36 In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General’s reports (see e.g. GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to “comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1”.
37 GOV/2010/46, para. 32.
38 See para.27 of this report and GOV/2011/29, para. 37.
39 Iran’s Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.
40 This material had been under Agency seal since 2003.
41 GOV/2003/75, paras 20–25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para.32, and Annex, paras 10–12; GOV/2004/60, para.33, and Annex, paras 1–7.
42 The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the nondiversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).