I. Design Information
43. The modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, which ever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities and in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement, which is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.39 The Agency is still awaiting receipt from Iran of updated design information for the IR-40 Reactor, and further information pursuant to statements it has made concerning the planned construction of new uranium enrichment facilitiesand the design of a reactor similar to TRR.40
44. As reported previously, Iran’s response to Agency requests for Iran to confirm or provide further information regarding its statements concerning its intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in “due time” rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.41
J. Additional Protocol
45. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.42
K. Other Matters
46. As previously reported, in August 2011 the Agency carried out a PIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) to verify, inter alia, nuclear material, in the form of natural uranium metal and process waste, related to conversion experiments carried out by Iran between 1995 and2002.43,44 The Agency’s measurement of this material was 19.8 kg less than the operator’s declaration of270.7 kg. In a letter dated 2 November 2011, Iran provided additional information in relation to this discrepancy. In a letter dated 16 December 2011, the Agency informed Iran that, taking into account this additional information, the discrepancy remained, and that, therefore, further information was required ofIran. During discussions with Iran on 13 and 14 February 2012, the Agency requested access to records and personnel involved in the uranium metal conversion experiments. Iran indicated that it no longer possessed the relevant documentation and that the personnel involved were no longer available. Iran also indicated that the discrepancy may have been caused by there being a higher amount of uranium in the waste than had been measured by the Agency. In light of this, Iran has offered to process all of the waste material and to extract the uranium contained there in. The Agency has begun taking additional destructive analysis samples ofmaterial involved. The discrepancy remains to be clarified.
47. As previously reported, in a letter dated 19 June 2011, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to“transfer some of spent fuel assemblies (HEU [high enriched uranium] Control Fuel Element (CFE) and Standard Fuel Element (SFE)) from spent fuel pool (KMPE) to reactor core (KMPB) in order to conduct aresearch project”. As of 12 February 2012, this activity had yet to begin.
48. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has continued the irradiation at TRR of fuel rods andplates manufactured at FMP (referred to in paragraphs 37-39 above), including the irradiation of: one naturalUO2 fuel rod;45 one of the fuel assemblies containing 12 rods of UO2 enriched to 3.34% U-235 (subsequentlyused to replace one of the control assemblies in the reactor core of TRR); one of the natural uranium fuelplates containing U3O8; and one fuel plate enriched to less than 20% U-235. On 22 February 2012, the Agency verified that the fuel assembly consisting of 14 fuel plates containing U3O8 enriched up to 20%U-235 was in the spent fuel bay of TRR.
49. On 10 January 2012, the Agency carried out an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP),during which the Agency noted that the reactor was shut down. In a letter dated 6 February 2012, Iran provided the Agency with the commissioning schedule for BNPP, which indicated that commissioning activity had commenced on 31 January 2012.