B. Credibility of Information
12. As indicated in paragraph 6 above, among the information available to the Agency is the alleged studies documentation: a large volume of documentation (including correspondence, reports, view graphsfrom presentations, videos and engineering drawings), amounting to over a thousand pages. The information reflected in that documentation is of a technically complex and interconnected nature, showing research, development and testing activities over time. It also contains working level correspondence consistent with the day to day implementation of a formal programme. Consistent with the Agency’s practice, that information has been carefully and critically examined. The Agency has also hadseveral meetings with the Member State to clarify the information it had provided, to question the Member State about the forensics it had carried out on the documentation and the information reflected in it, and to obtain more information on the underlying sources.
13. In addition to the alleged studies documentation, the Agency has received information from morethan ten Member States. This has included procurement information, information on international travel by individuals said to have been involved in the alleged activities, financial records, documents reflecting health and safety arrangements, and other documents demonstrating manufacturing techniques for certainhigh explosive components. This information reinforces and tends to corroborate the information reflectedin the alleged studies documentation, and relates to activities substantially beyond those identified in that documentation.
14. In addition to the information referred to in paragraphs 12 and 13 above, the Agency has acquired information as a result of its own efforts, including publications and articles acquired through open source research, satellite imagery, the results of Agency verification activities and information provided by Iranin the context of those verification activities.22 Importantly, the Agency has also had direct discussions with a number of individuals who were involved in relevant activities in Iran, including, for example, aninterview with a leading figure in the clandestine nuclear supply network (see paragraph 35 below). The information obtained by the Agency from the discussions with these individuals is consistent with the information provided by Member States, and that acquired through its own efforts, in terms of time frames and technical content.
15. As indicated in paragraph 8 above, Iran has acknowledged certain information reflected in the alleged studies documentation. However, many of the answers given by Iran to questions posed by the Agency in connection with efforts to resolve the Agency’s concerns have been imprecise and/or incomplete, and the information has been slow in coming and sometimes contradictory. This, combined with events such as the dismantling of the Lavisan-Shian site in late 2003/early 2004 (see paragraph 19 below), and a pattern of late or after the fact acknowledgement of the existence of previously undeclared parts of Iran’s nuclear programme, have tended to increase the Agency’s concerns, rather than dispelthem.
16. As indicated above, the information consolidated and presented in this Annex comes from a widevariety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is overall consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved and time frames. Based on these considerations, and in light of the Agency’s general knowledge of the Iranian nuclear programme and its historical evolution, the Agencyfinds the information upon which Part C of this Annex is based to be, overall, credible.