Attached are both info graphic formats- video and PDF for free use and distribution.
Enclosed are linked refrences for the info-graph PDF, citations in their full contexts:
[paragraphs 59-61, sec. c.11]
Operation “Green Salt”
Parchin Military Complex
[Paragraph 19, sec. C.1]
Operation “Green Salt”
[Annex- Historical review]
Natanz + Fordow
[paragraph 56, sec. c.9]
Fordow (Qom) [2007-2009]
[paragraph 38-39, sec. c.5]
[paraghraph 58, Sectoin C.8]
Jabr Ibn Hayan
Parchin Military Site
1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement1 and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in itsresolutions2 are binding on Iran.3 The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Councilresolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, inaccordance with the terms of those resolutions.4
3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,5 the Agency is required tocooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance orrestoration of international peace and security. All Members of the United Nations agree to accept andcarry out the decisions of the Security Council,6and in this respect, to take actions which are consistentwith their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
4. In a letter dated 26 May 2011, H.E. Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), informed the Director General that Iran would be preparedto receive relevant questions from the Agency on its nuclear activities after a declaration by the Agencythat the work plan (INFCIRC/711) had been fully implemented and that the Agency would there after implement safeguards in Iran in a routine manner. In his reply of 3 June 2011, the Director General informed Dr Abbasi that the Agency was neither in a position to make such a declaration, nor to conduct safeguards in Iran in a routine manner, in light of concerns about the existence in Iran of possible militarydimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. On 19 September 2011, the Director General met Dr Abbasi in Vienna, and discussed issues related to the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and otherrelevant obligations. In a letter dated 30 September 2011, the Agency reiterated its invitation to Iran to reengage with the Agency on the outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclearprogramme and the actions required of Iran to resolve those issues. In a letter dated 30 October 2011,DrAbbasi referred to his previous discussions with the Director General and expressed the will of Iran “toremove ambiguities, if any”, suggesting that the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG),should visit Iran for discussions. In his reply, dated 2 November 2011, the Director General indicated his preparedness to send the DDG-SG to “discuss the issues identified” in his forthcoming report to the Boardof Governors.
5. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/54, 2 September 2011), as wellas issues of longer standing, and, in line with the Director General’s opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, contains an Annex setting out in more detail the basis for the Agency’sconcerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. The report focuses on thoseareas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’snuclear programme.
B. Facilities Declared under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
6. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities and ninelocations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).7 Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continuesto implement safeguards at these facilities and LOFs.
C. Enrichment Related Activities
7. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has notsuspended its enrichment related activities in the following declared facilities, all of which arenevertheless under Agency safeguards.
C.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
8. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP): There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been providedfor Production Hall B.
9. As of 2 November 2011, 54 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A,37 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF6.8 Whereas initially each installed cascadecomprised 164 centrifuges, Iran has subsequently modified 15 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges each. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 2 November 2011, installation work inthe remaining five units was ongoing, but no centrifuges had been installed, and there had been noinstallation work in Production Hall B.
10. Between 15 October and 8 November 2011, the Agency conducted a physical inventory verification(PIV) at FEP, the results of which the Agency is currently evaluating.
11. Iran has estimated that, between 18 October 2010 and 1 November 2011, it produced 1787 kg of lowenriched UF6, which would result in a total production of 4922 kg of low enriched UF6 since productionbegan in February 2007.9 The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as allinstalled cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.10 The consequences for safeguards of the seal breakage in the feed and withdrawal area11 will be evaluated by the Agency upon completion of its assessment of the PIV.
12. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 200712and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).
13. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an areadesignated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).
14. In the production area, Iran first began feeding low enriched UF6 into Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010,for the stated purpose of producing UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel forthe Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). 13,14 Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF6 into two inter connected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges.15
15. Between 13 and 29 September 2011, the Agency conducted a PIV at PFEP and verified that, as of13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of low enriched UF6 had been fed into the cascade(s) in the production areasince the process began on 9 February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235had been produced. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the results of the PIV. Iran hasestimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of 44.7 kg of UF6 enriched atFEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20%U-235 were produced.
16. The preliminary results of the PIV show an improvement to the operator’s weighing system. Once the assessment of the PIV has been completed, the Agency will be able to determine whether the operator’s better sampling procedures have resulted in a more accurate determination of the level of U-235enrichment.16
17. In the R&D area, as of 22 October 2011, Iran had installed 164 IR-2m centrifuges in Cascade 5,17 all of which were under vacuum, and 66 IR-4 centrifuges in Cascade 4, none of which had been fed with UF6.In Cascades 2 and 3, Iran has been feeding natural UF6 into single machines, 10-machine cascades and20-machine cascades of IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges.
18. Between 21 August 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of approximately 59.8 kg of natural UF6 wasfed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails are recombined at the end of the process.
19. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP18 and otherverification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in theDIQ.
C.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
20. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. In its DIQ of 10 October 2009, Iran stated that the purpose of the facility was the production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235, and that the facility was being built tocontain 16 cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.19
21. In September 2010, Iran provided the Agency with a revised DIQ in which it stated that the purpose of FFEP was to include R&D as well as the production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235.
22. As previously reported, Iran provided the Agency with another revised DIQ in June 2011 in which the stated purpose of FFEP was the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, as well as R&D. Iraninformed the Agency that initially this production would take place within two sets of two interconnectedcascades, and that each of these cascades would consist of 174 centrifuges. Iran was reported to have decided to “triple its (production) capacity”, after which Iran would stop the “20% fuel production” at Natanz.20
23. On 17 October 2011, as anticipated in its letter to the Agency dated 11 October 2011, Iran transferred from FEP to FFEP one large cylinder containing LEU in the form of UF6 and one small cylinder containing depleted uranium (DU) in the form of UF6. According to Iran, the LEU will be used for feedingand the DU will be used for line passivation. On 24 October 2011, the Agency detached the seal on the cylinder containing the DU, and the cylinder was immobilized at the feeding station. At the request of Iran, the Agency will detach the seal on the cylinder containing the LEU on 8 November 2011, and the cylinder will be immobilized at the feeding station.
24. During an inspection on 23 and 24 October 2011, the Agency verified that Iran had installed all 174 centrifuges in each of two cascades, neither of which had been connected to the cooling and electricallines, and had installed 64 centrifuges in a third cascade. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1machines. Iran informed the Agency that the main power supply had been connected to the facility. No centrifuges had been installed in the area designated for R&D purposes.
25. The Agency continues to verify that FFEP is being constructed according to the latest DIQ providedby Iran. As previously reported, although Iran has provided some clarification regarding the initial timingof, and circumstances relating to, its decision to build FFEP at an existing defence establishment, additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility.21
26. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did notindicate the presence of enriched uranium.22
C.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities
27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of thisIranian year.23,24 In August 2011, Dr Abbasi was reported as having said that Iran did not need to buildnew enrichment facilities during the next two years.25 Iran has not provided information, as requested bythe Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.26 As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, theAgency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.
D. Reprocessing Activities
28. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.27 In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it “does not have reprocessing activities”. In that context, the Agencyhas continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.28 The Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 15 October 2011, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 16 October 2011. It isonly with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that theAgency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.
E. Heavy Water Related Projects
29. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is subject toAgency safeguards.29
30. On 17 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that construction of the facility was ongoing and the coolant heat exchangers had been installed. According toIran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.
31. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency, in aletter to Iran dated 20 October 2011, requested further access to HWPP. The Agency has yet to receive areply to that letter, and is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the HWPP appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency access tothe heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples.30
F. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication
32. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahanwhich, as described below, are in contravention of those obligations, although both facilities are underAgency safeguards.
33. Uranium Conversion Facility: On 18 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF duringwhich the Agency observed the ongoing installation of the process equipment for the conversion of UF6enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8. During the DIV, Iran informed the Agency that the initial tests of this conversion line, originally scheduled to start on 6 September 2011, had been postponed and would notinvolve the use of nuclear material.
34. As previously reported, Iran informed the Agency in July 2011 that it would start R&D activities at UCF for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO2. During the aforementioned DIV, Iran informed the Agency that 6.8 kg of DU in the form of UF6 had been processed and that Iran had produced 113 g of uranium in the form of UO2 that met its specifications. According to Iran, this UO2 has been sentto FMP to produce test pellets. Iran has also started using UF6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 to produce UO2. During the DIV, Iran further informed the Agency that this UO2 would also be sent to FMP to produce fuel pellets, which would then be sent to TRR for “performance test studies”.
35. In a letter dated 4 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency of the postponement of the production of natural UF6, involving the use of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant, originally scheduled to restart on 23 October 2011. In a letter dated 11 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that, from 11 November 2011, it intended to use UOC produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant for the production of natural uranium in the form of UO2. During the DIV on 18 October 2011, the Agency took a sample of this UOC. During the same DIV, Iran informed the Agency that, since 23 July 2011, it had fed into the process 958.7 kg of uranium in the form of UOC31 and produced about 185.6 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO2, and further indicated that some of the product had been fed back into the process. In a letter dated 8 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that it had transferred about 1 kg of this UO2 to the R&D section of FMP in order to “conduct research activities and pellet fabrication”.
36. Fuel Manufacturing Plant: As previously reported, in a DIQ for FMP dated 31 May 2011, Iran informed the Agency that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO2 manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR for irradiation and post-irradiation analysis. On 15 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection anda DIV at TRR and confirmed that, on 23 August 2011, Iran had started to irradiate a prototype fuel rod containing natural UO2 that had been manufactured at FMP. In a letter dated 30 August 2011, Iran informed the Agency that “for the time being” it had no plans to conduct any destructive testing on the rodand that only non-destructive testing would be conducted at TRR.
37. On 22 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iranhad started to install some equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR.32 During the inspection, the Agency verified five fuel plates containing natural U3O8 that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at FMP for testing purposes.
G. Possible Military Dimensions
38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.33 Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.
39. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency onthe resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.34 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligationsto take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise toconcerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.35 SinceAugust 2008, Iran has not engaged with the Agency in any substantive way on this matter.
40. The Director General, in his opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011,stated that in the near future he hoped to set out in greater detail the basis for the Agency’s concerns so that all Member States would be kept fully informed. In line with that statement, the Annex to this report provides a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency to date which has given rise toconcerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
41. The analysis itself is based on a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation in all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. This approach involves, inter alia, the identification of indicators of the existence ordevelopment of the processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.
42. The information which serves as the basis for the Agency’s analysis and concerns, as identified in the Annex, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals andorganizations involved, and time frames.
43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to thedevelopment of a nuclear explosive device:
- Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
- Efforts to develop undeclared path ways for the production of nuclear material (Annex,Section C.3);
- The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
- Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).
44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications,others are specific to nuclear weapons.
45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of anuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.