C.2. Procurement activities
25. Under the AMAD Plan, Iran’s efforts to procure goods and services allegedly involved a number of ostensibly private companies which were able to provide cover for the real purpose of the procurements. The Agency has been informed by several Member States that, for instance, Kimia Maadan was a covercompany for chemical engineering operations under the AMAD Plan while also being used to help with procurement for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).31
26. In addition, throughout the entire timeline, instances of procurement and attempted procurement byindividuals associated with the AMAD Plan of equipment, materials and services which, although havingother civilian applications, would be useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device, have eitherbeen uncovered by the Agency itself or been made known to it.32 Among such equipment, materials andservices are: high speed electronic switches and spark gaps (useful for triggering and firing detonators); high speed cameras (useful in experimental diagnostics); neutron sources (useful for calibrating neutron measuring equipment); radiation detection and measuring equipment (useful in a nuclear material production environment); and training courses on topics relevant to nuclear explosives development (suchas neutron cross section calculations and shock wave interactions/hydrodynamics).
C.3. Nuclear material acquisition
27. In 2008, the Director General informed the Board that: the Agency had no information at that time— apart from the uranium metal document — on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or onrelated nuclear physics studies,33 and that it had not detected the actual use of nuclear material inconnection with the alleged studies.34
28. However, as indicated in paragraph 22 above, information contained in the alleged studies documentation suggests that Iran was working on a project to secure a source of uranium suitable for usein an undisclosed enrichment programme, the product of which would be converted into metal for use inthe new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies. Additional informationprovided by Member States indicates that, although uranium was not used, kilogram quantities of naturaluranium metal were available to the AMAD Plan.
29. Information made available to the Agency by a Member State, which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran made progress with experimentation aimed at the recovery of uranium from fluoride compounds (using lead oxide as a surrogate material to avoid the possibility of uncontrolled contamination occurring in the workplace).
30. In addition, although now declared and currently under safeguards, a number of facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment (the Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom) were covertly built by Iran and only declared once the Agency was made aware of their existence by sources other than Iran. This, taken together with the past efforts by Iran to conceal activities involving nuclear material, create more concern about the possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran.